Princes of the Yen: Japan's Central Bankers and the Transformation of the Economy

<<<LOL! After the World War II, the household savings rate went up till the mid part of the 1970s. Since that time, it has shown a downward movement. The household saving rate of Japan was one of the maximum in the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development) countries till the 1980s. >>> LOL! yourself. There are MANY factors missing from that statement that an easily beguiled whore like yourself can never quite grasp, no matter how much you “study” and “research” and “debate” [and LIE and CHEAT and STEAL]:

  1. The bonuses to Japanese workers, which are around 50% of their annual salaries, don’t even count as part of their GDP.
  2. These bonuses don’t show up in any of the accounting schemes.
  3. They go straight into the Japanese Postal Savings Accounts which are *completely* private accounts, with no government or international oversight.
  4. Yes, their *official* savings rate DID decrease, from 34% to “only” 31%, which is INFINITELY higher than our NEGATIVE savings rate of -2% or -3%.
  5. “only” 31% of the AVERAGE family income of $120,740 is STILL $37,429 in personal savings, PER YEAR, PER JAPANESE family.
  6. JUST the amount the AVERAGE Japanese family SAVES is TWICE AS MUCH as the average American EARNS, and almost FOUR times as much as the average nigger “earns”, INCLUDING welfare.
  7. The TOTAL cost of government for the average Japanese household is $9,000 per year, compared to FORTY THREE THOUSAND HERE, *before* obama banana nigger “care”.
  8. Like most industrialized nations, Japan does not count the cost of government as a part of their “national product” as WE do.
And that’s the short list: OFFICIALLY Japan has $133 TRILLION in personal savings, but the REAL figure is probably TWICE that. John Knight
Original Message From: virginiaf.raines To: Jacob Israel Cc: John Hansen ; <a title="MSantom629 ; randulf.johan.hansen ; rdangler ; ritanke ; rolf-piro ; rudolf-bruno ; rustystjames ; tersch ; tomislav.sunic ; turkman ; vabraham ; vivaveridad ; wheink ; churi1001 ; nikon99 ; isaiah14 ; JoelRachmiel ; liyarath ; oldickeastman ; TSidd96472 ; lawson911 ; informationhighwayman ; ksidd37398 ; Jack Stone ; <a title="polyanker ; alan B'Stard M P ; <a title="hannajaeckel Sent: Friday, January 01, 2010 11:43 AM Subject: Princes of the Yen: Japan’s Central Bankers and the Transformation of the Economy
On Fri, Jan 1, 2010 at 4:02 AM, Jacob Israel <jk> wrote:
<<<More quotes about the Emperor, this time saying that the Emperor should rule over the entire world.>>>
The Emperor DOES rule the world–more than 95% of the world’s personal savings are in Japanese postal savings accounts, which he controls:
LOL! After the World War II, the household savings rate went up till the mid part of the 1970s. Since that time, it has shown a downward movement. The household saving rate of Japan was one of the maximum in the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development) countries till the 1980s. Nevertheless, there has been a stable decline in that position since that time and at present, the household saving rate of Japan is below the average household saving rate prevailing in the OECD countries. Therefore, it can be mentioned that the household savings rate of Japan was high both in relative and absolute terms, however it has gone down both in relative and absolute terms. The household savings rate in Japan only experienced significant rises in the 1960s, 1970s and in the earlier part of 1980s. The reasons behind the household savings rate being high in the above mentioned period could be categorized into the following types:
  • The demographic features (especially age)
  • Traditional, cultural and religious factors
  • The decreased extent of household assets
  • The increased rate of growth in income
  • The underdeveloped (or developing) consumer credit arrangement
  • The underdeveloped (or developing) social security arrangement
  • Saving encouragement functions
  • Tax benefits for saving
The majority of these factors were not so much prevalent since the mid part of 1970s and that is why household saving rate in Japan is falling since that time. This can be delineated as follows:
  • Enervating of tradition and culture
  • Fast aging of the inhabitants of Japan
  • The fall in the income growth rate since the earlier part of 1970s
  • Rises in the extent of household assets
  • Developments in the social security arrangement since 1973
  • Developments in the consumer credit arrangement since the 1970s
  • The abolishment of the majority of tax benefits for saving since 1988
  • The abolishment of the majority of saving encouragement functions
Princes of the Yen: Japan’s Central Bankers and the Transformation of the Economy by Richard A. Werner Princes of the Yen: Japan’s central bankers and the transformation … – Google Books Result by Richard Werner – 2003 – Political Science – 362 pages This book provides a global perspective of racism in its myriad forms. If you penetrate what Werner says, which I don’t will be difficult, then it is immediately understandable that Japan was never “reformed” after WWII at all. There is one really bad review at Amazon — ignore that guy. There were many key Allied military figures in the Asia Front war who were pro-fascist. A number of writers and conspiracy theories discuss certain aspects of the relationships. David Guyatt focuses on the enormous amounts of Nazi gold but even more so, the Japanese gold plundered from all Asia. Much of it wound up hidden in the Philippines. If you want to understand quickly how bad the dealing with Japan became, realize that Japan was not required to pay reparations. The Koreans and Chinese were deprived of compensation, as were individual US servicemen. I don’t know how much other countries suffered from the Japanese, but Korea and China had horrible experiences, and the war with Japan had been going on for years. War overview Why the US Shields Japan’s WWII Denials [?] And this is the last chapter of a manuscript regarding covert operations and activities which raise grave questions. The Last Circle, Chapter 15 THE ASIAN BOOKSHELF

Pulling away the curtains from the ‘Princes of the Yen’

They are not elected, yet they control the country’s financial destiny

By BILL TOTTEN PRINCES OF YEN: Central Bankers and the Transformation of the Economy, by Richard A. Werner. London: M.E. Sharpe, 2003, 362 pp., $ 27.95, (paper). Richard A. Werner has written a rare book. “The Princes of the Yen” is a scholarly, thoroughly researched treatise on economics that reads like a detective novel. The 248 pages of text are such a fast read that one might think the book a work of fiction if it weren’t for the logic of Werner’s arguments — as well as the 48 pages of footnotes, 19 pages of bibliography and 30-page technical appendix that provide the evidence to support those arguments. The book is about the autocrats who run the Bank of Japan, how they operate and what they have been trying to achieve. In the process, many puzzles about Japan’s economy are solved. These “princes” are neither elected by Japanese citizens nor held accountable to their elected officials. Presiding princes choose their successors who, in turn, seem to be accountable only to their benefactors. Werner, a German economist who has studied and worked in Tokyo, names them, reveals their suspiciously close relations with the United States, describes the tool they use to control Japan’s economy, and tells how they have used that tool to grow the economy when they sought growth and to cripple the economy when that served their own aims. Werner specifically accuses the princes of surreptitiously using their control over Japan’s supply of credit to prevent an economic recovery for the past decade. Why? In order to achieve the “reform” or transformation of Japan’s economy into a carbon copy of today’s U.S. economy that the princes deemed necessary for Japan. Werner alleges that they wreaked this havoc on the nation, causing immense suffering to its citizenry — including record levels of unemployment, bankruptcies and suicides — to cow the nation’s politicians, bureaucrats and citizens into accepting reforms the princes knew were too contrary to special and general interests to be accepted other than in the wake of such havoc. At first glance this accusation may seem far-fetched. But what makes this book special is how, like a skilled courtroom prosecutor working a jury, Werner carefully and thoroughly lays out the evidence to persuade his readers that his allegations are true. Window guidance Werner begins by pointing out something rarely discussed in Japan: that the “traditional” Japanese economic model — widely considered responsible for the “economic miracle” that built the world’s second-largest economy from the bombed-out ruins of World War II in just 30 years — isn’t traditional at all. Company unions, lifetime employment, government regulation and a business ethos favoring cooperation over competition and customers and employees over stockholders were consciously introduced during World War II. With the approval of the U.S., Japan retained its wartime economic system and kept its bureaucratic elite in power. This enabled Japan’s “economic miracle” and conquest of world markets after the war. Werner says money was the main tool bureaucrats used to control Japan’s economy during and after the war. The credit controls survived largely unchanged into the postwar era, taking the form of the extralegal and secretive “window guidance” operated by the BOJ. According to Werner, “guiding” credit to selected industries and preventing others, such as consumers, from obtaining it, was at the core of Japan’s postwar success. Who are these “princes”? Law limits the tenure of the governor of the BOJ to five years. For decades, the Ministry of Finance and the BOJ have alternately supplied the candidate for governor. However, Werner found that whenever a Ministry of Finance man became governor, he would be excluded systematically from key discussions, namely those involving the quantity of credit. Real authority resided in his deputy, always be the born-and-bred BOJ man who became the next official governor. Thus, throughout the postwar history, the trueborn BOJ governors had control all of the time — first as deputy governor, then as governor. Werner also finds the selection of these princes, the rulers over Japan’s economy, similar to how dictators tend to choose their successors. Instead of merit and ability, the primary criteria are loyalty and the sharing of common goals. To cultivate his loyalty, the successor is nominated early on so that he will feel indebted to his mentor and repay him by following his policies. This puts the actions of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi into perspective. Perhaps he thought he had chosen Toshihiko Fukui in February this year as central bank governor. Actually Fukui had been chosen in the late 1960s as today’s governor of the BOJ (with everyone in between fixed as well). That’s why he has been known as “prince” since his early 30s. Werner next examines why these “princes of the yen” crippled Japan’s economy from the mid-1980s. Werner uses the princes’ own utterances, together with an analysis of their actual but little-known credit policies, to reveal their goals. These were never secret, but plain for all to see. The princes have consistently argued for the need to “reform” or “transform” Japan’s economy, through structural changes, into the type of deregulated and liberalized system demanded by U.S. trade negotiators. If the BOJ has no mandate and no regulatory power to directly implement structural reform, how can it achieve a structural transformation of the “systems that supported the postwar development of Japan’s economy”? And how can current monetary policy be helpful in achieving this long-term goal of structural reform? The answer is revealed in the official statements by BOJ executives that Werner cites: The BOJ can be helpful by not being helpful. The princes recognized that such structural change was so opposed to the special and general interests of most Japanese — citizens, businessmen, bureaucrats and politicians — that it could be achieved only by crippling the economy and preventing its recovery. Werner traces the origin of this reform movement, now mostly associated with Koizumi and Finance Minister Heizo Takenaka, back to 1983 when “prince” Tadashi Sasaki called for a transformation and liberalization of the Japanese economy. The better-known report issued in 1986 by his successor Haruo Maekawa (and to which “prince” Yasushi Mieno also contributed) stated that “the time has thus come for Japan to make a historical transformation of its traditional policies on economic management and the nation’s lifestyle. . . . there is an urgent need for Japan to implement drastic policies for structural adjustment and to seek to transform the Japanese economic structure into one oriented toward international cooperation.” Echoing U.S. trade negotiators, it called for administrative reform, deregulation, import expansion and greater market access for foreigners. In short, the “transformation” of the entire body politic, the abolition of the war economy system, and the introduction of a U.S.-style free market economy. The Maekawa report and its updates of 1987 and 1988 are known inside the BOJ simply as the “ten-year plan.” BOJ, Reichsbank and the ECB In a thrilling who-dunnit, Werner uncovers the full story of the creation of the Japanese bubble economy of the 1980s and identifies the key decision-makers. He warns that the BOJ has acted like a “second government” in the pursuit of a political agenda. The princes got what they wanted, including legal independence and the long-sought dismantling of the hitherto dominant Ministry of Finance. Today, Werner warns, they are even less accountable for its actions. There is good news for investors in all this: Artificially created recession can also be ended on short notice when it has served its purpose. Many of the goals have been achieved. Governor Fukui might well end the long slump. In the meantime, Werner’s marvelous book is a must-read for anyone interested in Japan or, for that matter, how central banks work in many other countries, such as in Asia or Europe. His final chapter on the European Central Bank and its connection to Adolf Hitler’s Reichsbank (a connection shared with the BOJ) should come as a wake-up call to many European observers who have failed to recognize the role of the ECB’s credit creation policy in the propagation of Germany’s slump. Drawing parallels between Germany’s recession and Japan’s deflation has become popular. But the recent statements by ECB leaders — that Germany must fundamentally change its economic structure — indicate that the similarities may be far closer than we would wish. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ On Fri, Jan 1, 2010 at 4:02 AM, Jacob Israel <jk> wrote:
<<<More quotes about the Emperor, this time saying that the Emperor should rule over the entire world.>>>
The Emperor DOES rule the world–more than 95% of the world’s personal savings are in Japanese postal savings accounts, which he controls: We won the war? Don’t tell the Japanese that. Why is Japan still racially pure while we’ve become a .hit can for races, with cities with murder rates FOUR HUNDRED TIMES HIGHER (400X) than Japan? John Knight
Original Message From: virginiaf.raines To: John Hansen Cc: Jacob Israel ; <a title="hannajaeckel ; alan B'Stard M P ; <a title="polyanker ; Jack Stone ; <a title="ksidd37398 ; informationhighwayman ; lawson911 ; TSidd96472 ; oldickeastman ; liyarath ; JoelRachmiel ; isaiah14 ; nikon99 ; churi1001 ; wheink ; vivaveridad ; vabraham ; turkman ; tomislav.sunic ; tersch ; rustystjames ; rudolf-bruno ; rolf-piro ; ritanke ; rdangler ; randulf.johan.hansen ; MSantom629 Sent: Thursday, December 31, 2009 9:46 PM Subject: universal thinking? How would you know, Hansen? You believe every anti/jew lie and smear, and support white supremacy. I’m white, and I don’t love you. Or Hallstrom. Or the rest of the dipshits. If jews aren’t superior [agreed], then what makes you superior? The Japanese thought they were the most superior of all. MacArthur and Willoughby papered over Japanese atrocities.
Adolf Tscheppe-Weidenbach, the son of Baron von Tscheppe-Weidenbach from Baden, Germany, and Emma Willoughby, was born in 1892. After attending the University of Heidelberg, Willoughby moved to the United States in 1910 and became known as Charles Willoughby. Willoughby joined the United States Army and served with Company K, 5th U.S. Infantry, and eventually reached the rank of sergeant. He was commissioned a major in May 1914 in the Officers Volunteer Corps. During the First World War Willoughby served on the Western Front. In October 1919 Captain Willoughby was reassigned to the 24th Infantry serving at Columbus, New Mexico. His next assignment took him overseas to San Juan, Puerto Rico, where again he served as both company and battalion commander in the 65th Infantry from February 1921 to May 1923. He now joined the Military Intelligence Division, as served as Military Attaché duties in Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador. In August, 1929, Willoughby started a course at the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. After graduating two years later, he stayed on at the school as an instructor, teaching the subjects of Intelligence and Military History. He also edited the Command and General Staff School Quarterly.

Actual Japanese Quotes About the War

The book “Through Japanese Eyes” has numerous quotes from Japanese sources about the times leading up to the war and the war itself, and these quotes give a very good idea of the state of mind of those who were behind the war. I will reproduce a few of the quotes under separate topics.
The author is going to let the quotes from the Japanese speak for themselves, mainly.
The author goes into why the war started. The average person in the U.S. didn’t understand just how vicious war-minded and power-mad people can be. (1) The second was the superiority the West felt over the East. (2)
More about the war, and then the first two quotes, both of which show the idea that Japan had that the entire world must be under the guidance and control of Japan. This was the idea of bringing the ‘four corners of the world under one roof.’
All of these quotes show just how strongly some of the Japanese thinkers and leaders felt about the U.S. and Britain, that both countries needed to be destroyed. Period.
This is the quote that got a lot of people mad at Yamamoto, and was even used on various World War II posters.
These two quotes are from Tojo, who became the effective head of Japan for a while.
What would have been the peace terms as dictated by the Japanese.
tn_6.jpg tn_7.jpg
The author lays a great deal of the blame for how the Japanese behave on the Shinto religion.
He finishes his discussion of Shinto, and then begins the quotes section.
He goes into more discussion of Shinto, this time linking it to Emperor worship.
More quotes about the Emperor, this time saying that the Emperor should rule over the entire world.
The idea of Japan ruling over the entire world goes all the way back to the first Emperor.
tn_12.jpg tn_12a.jpg
Yet more on the idea of everyone being under Japanese dominance.
Tojo again, this time using the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere concept.
One of the strangest quotes in the entire book.
tn_14.jpg tn_15.jpg
The author then confronts one of the more controversial aspects, and that is what was Hirohito’s role in all of this?
The actual declaration of war from Hirohito.
Some things Hirohito did to show he was in support of the war.
More from the Emperor and more from Tojo.
tn_17a.jpg tn_18.jpg
The plan for world conquest.
Preparation for war.
European and American thought is evil!
Chinese thought isn’t any better!
A one-party system is the way things should be.
The Japanese paid attention to what was going on in the U.S., and used events to their own purposes.
tn_24.jpg tn_25.jpg
Although some authors have said that the war was racial in nature, the White race trying to subjugate the Asian race, the Japanese already had that idea.
tn_26.jpg tn_27.jpg
Japanese anti-Semitism.
One guy saying the war with the U.S. started in 1927.
What one Japanese paper thought of Americans.
Tojo saying Japan has never lost a war.
Why the attack on Pearl Harbor happened when it did.
tn_32.jpg tn_33.jpg
Why the attack was carried out in the first place.
They thought they could destroy the entire American Navy.
Plans for invading America.
Planned use of biological weapons.
Tojo again.
Don’t worry, be happy. The Emperor will save us (somehow).
What was this guy smoking?
Why they yelled Banzai!
Let me get this right. After you are dead by beheading, your head is supposed to fight on?
Lying about how they treated P.O.W.s.
tn_43.jpg tn_44.jpg tn_45.jpg tn_46.jpg tn_47.jpg
tn_48.jpg tn_49.jpg tn_50.jpg tn_50a.jpg tn_51.jpg
How they were really treated. Japan main page Japanese-American Internment Camps index page Japan and World War II index page Back to start of kimono section \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ On Tue, Dec 29, 2009 at 10:48 PM, John Hansen <majorhart> wrote:

13 responses to “Princes of the Yen: Japan's Central Bankers and the Transformation of the Economy”

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